Why Iran Joining a Defense Pact Could Reshape the Middle…

Key Takeaways

• A Chinese commentator argues Iran joining a Gulf defense pact would create a "Middle East NATO" aligned with Shanghai Cooperation Organization goals.
• The video claims such a bloc targets energy infrastructure and economic logic, not just Israel.
• It predicts China's shift to cheap electricity and chemical synthesis could eventually replace fossil fuel demand.
• The speaker frames China's strategy as pragmatic, contrasting it with U.S. coercion of Gulf states.

The Middle East is heading for a "big finale" if Iran joins the collective defense clause, according to a Chinese political commentator on Douyin. The region already holds both energy production and transit routes, with three major international energy arteries passing through. But the key question is where the land exports go. Pipelines all lead eastward.

Pakistan's ambassador to Russia reportedly said Pakistan does not oppose Iran joining the Saudi-led collective defense agreement — the military defense cooperation pact. Think about the implications. If Iran joins, the situation becomes deeply complicated. Iran and Saudi Arabia have a history of rivalry. But if Tehran enters this pact, the structure starts to resemble a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Middle East branch. These countries are all SCO members. The SCO's purpose is counterterrorism. If they all fight terrorism and sign a joint defense treaty, you're building a mechanism similar to a Middle East NATO.

NATO has collective procurement. Collective procurement means collective defense. And behind collective defense lies unified operational planning, unified tactics, unified strategy, and a unified command system. Who is the terrorist? Think about it. Some say this targets Israel. But it doesn't target Israel — it targets international energy infrastructure.

If Iran joins the collective defense clause, the Middle East reaches its endgame. It has energy output and energy transit. Three international energy arteries pass through. More critically, the land export routes — the oil pipelines — all lead east. What does this target? It targets the economic foundation, the energy logic, the infrastructure logic. Dig deeper and it targets national sovereignty and credit security.

Why choose China? Because China no longer needs the fossil fuel logic. China is "desireless" — it has no need for oil [Note: "无欲则刚" — a Chinese idiom meaning "one is invincible when desireless"]. The U.S. needs oil more, but the Gulf states can't choose America. Look at the U.S. logic with Gulf countries: obey and get small payments, disobey and face regime change. That's the old pattern. Now consider Saudi Arabia's NEOM city project — it's Saudi's version of national infrastructure and energy transition planning. That's why the U.S. is rushing to control pipelines. But I estimate it's too late. If this comes together, the U.S. is finished.

We're not as dismissive of America as we appear. We have firm strategic calculations driving our actions. This is the difference between idealists and realists.

Someone asks: if the world becomes fully electrified, how will China buy oil from these countries? They're ignoring that crude oil isn't just burned. The petrochemical line hasn't reached its peak yet. Petrochemicals can produce many things, even product recycling loops. China might eventually reverse-synthesize oil in chemical synthesis. This isn't impossible — Germany already does it at scale. China's Shenhua Group also does coal-to-oil conversion. It's a cost problem, not a technical one. The cost lies in energy. China is pursuing ultra-low electricity prices. Once that line runs through — ultra-cheap electricity combined with chemical synthesis — you can synthesize oil.

Is fossil energy polluting? Look at China's National VI emission standards. Look at the flags on Hongqi cars. If technology meets standards, emissions can be near zero. Technically, it's achievable. I believe it can be done. The issue is internal combustion engines have low thermal efficiency and can't support large-scale energy storage.

Many people ask why we don't mass-produce certain things. I've talked about Li Xiangzhu [Note: likely a reference to a strategic thinker or historical figure, possibly Li Dawei or a pseudonym for a realist strategist]. I've always said: stay low-key, use others' strengths. This is what I've preached for years. Why bring it up now? Because we're essentially executing that strategy at the national level.

Someone asks if we followed that strategy during the poor early years. I'll say clearly: no. The biggest Chinese principle is that when poor, you must be tough — poor and fierce. That was our strategy then; we feared nothing. But once national construction achieves results, the wealth accumulated by ordinary people and the social resources built by the state should not be wasted. So we must understand: whose strategy defines today?

That's why I talk about the "100-year theory." Many people get upset because they don't want to believe that after our hard early years, we now focus on building "generational advantage." Americans understand this too. The main problem is that in the process of fighting, we must accumulate generational advantage. This approach suits Chinese thinking — we're an agricultural nation that closes the door and builds generational advantage. But the flaw is that closing the door and building behind it means slow development. So we must firmly go outward, making external circulation excellent. Look at when external circulation exploded — it was when we started talking about strengthening domestic circulation. That's the turning point.

Why It Matters for International Readers

This video represents a strand of Chinese nationalist-pragmatic commentary that blends geopolitical analysis with domestic economic strategy. The speaker is not a government official but reflects a popular online narrative that frames China as a patient, strategic actor reshaping global energy politics. The claim that Iran joining a Gulf defense pact would create an "SCO Middle East branch" shows how some Chinese influencers view regional security through Beijing's institutional lens — even if the SCO itself has no such defense mechanism.

For international readers, the significance lies in how Chinese public discourse interprets Middle East alliances. The video suggests China's interest in the region is less about immediate oil imports and more about long-term infrastructure and petrochemical positioning. This aligns with Beijing's actual policy of deepening ties with Gulf states while avoiding formal military commitments. The commentary also reveals domestic debates about energy transition — specifically the idea that China's push for cheap renewable electricity could eventually disrupt traditional oil markets.

The broader stakes involve U.S.-China competition in the Gulf. The speaker's framing of American policy as coercive ("obey or face regime change") versus China's "desireless" approach reflects a common Chinese narrative that Beijing offers non-interventionist partnerships. Whether accurate or not, this perception shapes how Gulf states might hedge between Washington and Beijing. For businesses and policymakers, understanding this narrative matters because it influences Chinese public support for overseas infrastructure projects and energy deals.

Sources

• Original: Douyin commentator (video on Iran, Gulf defense pacts, and China's energy strategy, date not specified)
• Context: Reuters — "Saudi Arabia, Iran resume ties after China-brokered deal, March 2023" (widely reported)
• Context: AP News — "China's SCO expands with Iran as full member, July 2023" (widely reported)

SUMMARY: A Chinese commentator argues Iran joining Gulf defense pacts could create an SCO-aligned bloc targeting energy infrastructure, while China's shift to cheap electricity and chemical synthesis may eventually reduce fossil fuel dependence.

Originally published on China View.